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SUPREME COURT FOREWORD,
OCTOBER TERM 2011: FEDERALISM POINTS
AND THE SOMETIME RECOGNITION OF
ESSENTIAL FEDERAL POWER
Jonathan D. Varat*
For some time now, a narrow but persistent majority of the Supreme
Court has undertaken the project of circumscribing federal power.
Marching under the banner of state sovereignty, this majority has
attacked the flanks of congressional power in at least three areas: its
enumerated powers, its power to direct the state administration of
federal programs, and its power to abrogate state immunity from suit.
During the October Term 2011, the battle over the appropriate balance
of federal power and state sovereignty continued in earnest on all three
fronts. This Foreword examines the Court’s 2011 term to find those
points where contested federal power was upheld and reinforced and
those where state sovereignty prevailed. These points tell us a great
deal about the current state of affairs and the nature of the Court’s
ongoing conflict, revealing that while some important federal
strongholds held well, the state sovereignty forces rather clearly
advanced further, though not always in lockstep either substantively or
strategically.

* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles School of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For some time now, particularly after the replacement of Justice
Thurgood Marshall by Justice Clarence Thomas in 1991, a newly
oriented, narrow, but persistent majority of the Supreme Court has
undertaken the project of moving our constitutional landscape in the
direction of circumscribing the power of Congress and enhancing
state sovereignty. It has done so in a form of pincer movement, with
the majority forces that march under the banner of state sovereignty
attacking the flanks of federal power in at least three ways: (1) by
limiting the scope of some of the most significant of the enumerated
powers of Congress, (2) by enhancing the litigation immunity of the
States under the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, and (3) by
restricting the power of Congress to regulate the States qua States in
the name of defending the core of state legislative and executive
autonomy. It has advanced in fits and starts, sometimes pursuing
evolutionary and sometimes more revolutionary campaigns, but its
accumulated progress in the last two decades has been substantial.
The significance of each advance, and all the advances taken
together thus far, is a matter of opinion, but the overall direction is
clear enough, and it is unlikely to change, much less reverse, without
judicial reinforcements added to the ranks of the defenders of
congressional prerogative.
In launching and sustaining this assault, moreover, this
slender—if changing—state sovereignty majority of five Justices has
enforced its vision of the structural protections of federalism at least
as energetically as the Court often has enforced the antimajoritarian,
individual rights protections of the Constitution. In particular, it has
acted without much regard for the protective role played by the
political safeguards of federalism;1 it has relied instead on what fairly
can be called the judicial safeguards of federalism, wielded
essentially in the same fashion as the judicial safeguards of
individual rights. Deference to Congress has been grudging,
apparently because belief in the fundamental importance of state
sovereignty is so strong, and because of the majority’s perception
1. The classic statement of this idea is found in Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards
of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). The Court employed the idea in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), in the process of rejecting a claim
of state regulatory immunity from federal regulation.
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that Congress too cavalierly has usurped power that does not belong
to it, throwing out of balance the proper relationship between the
dual sovereigns.
Precedent sometimes has slowed the advance, but it hardly has
been an impenetrable fortification. More potent for the defenders of
federal power has been the Court’s likely unanimous belief that the
objective has never been the unconditional surrender of all federal
power, but the more limited objective of containment—of reigning in
perceived congressional excesses without losing sight of the reality
that national power is often needed to govern wide swaths of a
globally, much less nationally, interdependent economy; that a
unified nation must be maintained in the face of potentially
dangerous centrifugal forces; that explicit enforcement authority for
the protection of specified civil rights must be acknowledged, to
some extent at least; and that the nation’s capacity for unified
responses to geopolitical challenges must be preserved and
supported.
During the Court’s 2011 term, the battle over the appropriate
balance of federal power and state sovereignty continued in earnest
on all three fronts: the scope of Congress’s enumerated power, its
power to abrogate state immunity from suit, and its power to direct
state administration of federal programs. Taking stock of the decisive
encounters, the pattern of the last two decades persisted. The state
sovereignty forces rather clearly advanced further, though not always
in lockstep either substantively or strategically. Yet some important
federal strongholds held as well. In the end, there were notable
affirmations and notable limitations of federal power—a mixed set of
results that rather unmistakably still points toward future gains on
behalf of state sovereignty at the expense of congressional power.
The aim of this Foreword is to highlight and examine the
“federalism points” where contested federal power was upheld and
reinforced and those where state sovereignty prevailed. Those
“points”—both in the sense of cartographic points on the newly
drawn map where each sovereign is allowed to govern following the
term’s federal and state struggles, and in the sense of the points made
or scored by various Justices in the process of disagreement—tell us
a great deal about the current state of affairs and the nature of the
Court’s ongoing conflict. I use the Court’s deeply divided decision
upholding the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
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(the ACA),2 its equally divided decision holding that Congress
lacked constitutional authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity
from damages suits under the self-care provision of the Family and
Medical Leave Act,3 and the term’s preemption decisions—
especially the successful challenge to three of four provisions of the
stringent Arizona law aimed at restricting aliens not lawfully present
in the United States4—to identify and critique these federalism
points.
II. FEDERAL POWER, STATE
SOVEREIGNTY, AND THE ACA
The 900-plus page ACA is one of the most complex and
politically controversial pieces of legislation ever enacted. It sets out
a comprehensive program seeking to produce health insurance
coverage for millions of people who lack it and simultaneously
reduces the cost of health care. Among the ACA’s multitude of
provisions, federalism-based constitutional challenges to Congress’s
power were leveled at two key ones: (1) the so-called individual
mandate provision that requires most, but not all, of the populace
either to maintain “minimum essential” health insurance coverage or,
for those who fail to do so and are not exempt (primarily because
their income is too low), to make a “shared responsibility
payment”—described by the ACA as a “penalty”—to the IRS; and
(2) the Medicaid expansion provision, requiring States to expand the
scope and coverage of their existing, largely federally funded
Medicaid programs—which help provide medical care to pregnant
women, children, needy families, the blind, the elderly, and the
disabled—to now cover a much larger segment of the population
(primarily a much larger group of the poor) as well. The ACA offers
to pay for most, but not all, of the required expansion, and it provides
that a State failing to comply with the new coverage requirements
risks losing not just the funds for the required expansion, but all of its
federal Medicaid funds.
The ACA addressed a wide range of health insurance issues, at
least two of which prompted the adoption of the individual
mandate—the costly use of emergency medical care by those without
2. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
4. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
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insurance who by virtue of federal and state law could not be denied
care, and the inability of individuals with pre-existing serious health
conditions to obtain affordable or any insurance. Congress enacted
the “guaranteed issue” requirement to prohibit insurers from limiting
or denying altogether health insurance for individuals with preexisting conditions, and it adopted the “community rating”
requirement for insurance policy pricing to prohibit insurers from
charging higher premiums to those individuals. As several States had
discovered earlier, however, those measures introduced a strong
incentive for uninsured individuals to wait until they became ill
before buying the insurance that could no longer be denied them. The
individual mandate sought to enlarge the insurance risk pool to
include more currently healthy people so that insurers would not be
placed in a financially unviable situation that would lead them either
to leave the market or to charge even higher insurance premiums to
those who maintained insurance.
Twenty-six states, some private individuals, and the National
Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) sued, seeking to have the
individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion provisions
invalidated for lack of federal power to adopt them, and then to have
the entire ACA invalidated on the ground that these provisions could
not be severed from the remainder of the Act. The Court heard a
remarkable three days of oral argument on whether the Tax AntiInjunction Act barred the suit as a prohibited effort to restrain
collection of a tax before it is paid; whether Congress had the
authority to enact the individual mandate pursuant to any or all of its
enumerated commerce, necessary and proper, or taxing powers;
whether its spending power allowed the Medicaid expansion
program, with its particular enforcement mechanism; and whether, if
the Court concluded that one or both of these central parts of the
ACA were unconstitutional, it would be appropriate to sever
whatever was held invalid from the many remaining provisions,
without doing violence to the ACA’s overall scheme.
On the final day of the term, the Court issued its sharply divided
ruling in the already famous case of National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB).5 Technically, Chief Justice
Roberts authored an opinion for a majority of the Court (comprised
5. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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of himself and Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan)
resolving only two issues in the case. First, the majority held that the
Anti-Injunction Act did not apply because the suit was not one to
restrain collection of a tax within the meaning of that statute.6
Second, reaching the merits, the Court held that the individual
mandate reasonably could be—and therefore should be—construed
for constitutional purposes to be an exercise of Congress’s power to
tax and that, as such, Congress had ample authority to adopt it.7
The remainder of the Chief Justice’s lead opinion did not
officially garner a majority, but the Court as a whole reached other
majority conclusions, despite the absence of a majority opinion.
Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito filed a joint dissent
arguing in favor of invalidating the entire ACA, because in their
view Congress lacked power to adopt either the individual mandate
or the Medicaid expansion, and those provisions could not be
severed from the rest of the ACA. Probably out of pique that Chief
Justice Roberts was not willing to go nearly as far as they would, the
joint dissenters conspicuously did not join any aspect of his lead
opinion and officially withheld any concurrence in his opinion at all,
even though the dissent, in at least some respects, essentially
mirrored some of the Chief Justice’s conclusions and reasoning. Like
Chief Justice Roberts, and for the same reasons—and unlike the four
who joined him in upholding the individual mandate as a permissible
exercise of the taxing power—they found that Congress could not
enact the individual mandate under its commerce and necessary and
proper powers. Also, and again for virtually the same reasons, like
the Chief Justice (who, in this respect, was joined by Justices Breyer
and Kagan), the joint dissenters concluded that Congress lacked
power under the Spending Clause to threaten states choosing not to
6. Id. at 2582–84.
7. Id. at 2600. Although many professional and lay critics—including the joint dissenters,
id. at 2656 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting)—apparently thought that treating
the individual mandate provision as not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, but as a tax
for purposes of whether Congress had power to enact it, was verbal legerdemain, the use of the
same language in different ways in statutory and constitutional contexts is hardly new. Perhaps
the most dramatic example involves Article III of the Constitution and the congressional grant of
federal question jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Although they “use nearly identical language in
conferring jurisdiction over actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United
States, it is now well-established that the constitutional language reaches considerably more
broadly than does the language of § 1331.” RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 748 (6th ed. 2009).
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comply with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion requirements with the
loss of all their pre-existing Medicaid funding. For the first time
ever, largely because Medicaid funding makes up such a large
portion of state budgets, the Court held a spending power condition
too “coercive” of state sovereignty.8 In fact, on this point the
dissenters, despite withholding their official concurrence, were
explicit in noting that “[s]even Members of the Court agree that the
Medicaid Expansion, as enacted by Congress, is unconstitutional.”9
Furthermore, because they disagreed with the majority’s conclusion
that the individual mandate could properly be understood as a
permissible exercise of the taxing power, they also determined that,
since the mandate was not a tax, the Tax Anti-Injunction Act was
clearly inapplicable.10 For different reasons, then, the Court was
unanimous in concluding that the constitutional merits of the case
were properly before it.
How to respond to the conclusion by seven Justices that the
Medicaid expansion enforcement provision was unduly coercive of
state sovereignty was the final dividing point. As noted, the joint
dissenters believed the Medicaid expansion provision as a whole
should be invalidated. Chief Justice Roberts, together with Justices
Breyer and Kagan, concluded that it was enough to invalidate the
authorization for withholding all Medicaid funds from states that did
not choose to expand Medicaid in accordance with the ACA
requirements, and to allow Congress to leave the states free to choose
whether to accept the additional federal funding for Medicaid
expansion in accordance with ACA requirements. Justices Ginsburg
and Sotomayor contended that Congress had not exceeded its
spending power in any respect, but—having lost on that point—they
concurred in the judgment “that Congress may offer States funds ‘to
expand the availability of health care, and requir[e] that States
accepting such funds comply with the conditions on their use’”
contained in the ACA.11
When all was said and done, the Court had upheld all of the
ACA except for the provision allowing (though not compelling) the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to withhold from states that
8.
9.
10.
11.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601–07 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
Id. at 2666–67 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
Id. at 2656.
Id. at 2642 (Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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do not comply with the ACA’s “new coverage requirements . . . not
only the federal funding for those requirements, but all . . . federal
Medicaid funds.”12 The power of Congress to use its taxing authority
to support a mandate to buy health insurance by imposing a tax
“penalty” for those who do not, and the power of Congress to use its
conditional spending authority to induce States to undertake federal
programs in accordance with federal requirements, so long as the
federal funding offer is not coercively deployed, were reaffirmed.
Still, for the first time ever, the Court held a federal spending
condition invalid as too invasive of state autonomy. Moreover, a
majority of Justices, whether in dictum or not—and to the surprise of
many on all sides—rejected the power of Congress under both the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause to compel
economic activity, even where Congress believed that such
compulsion was necessary as part of a comprehensive effort to
improve the financial condition of a vast national market involving
health providers, consumers, and insurers.
Much already has been written, and much more will be, about
this major federalism episode. For some, including me, the
majority’s unwillingness to uphold the individual mandate under the
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause comes as an
unwelcome and unpersuasive surprise, with quite uncertain
implications for the future of congressional power. For others, most
obviously the joint dissenters, the bigger surprise was that Chief
Justice Roberts, having reached that conclusion, nonetheless was
willing to uphold the individual mandate as an exercise of
Congress’s taxing power. For now, leaving to others a more detailed
analysis of the various elements of NFIB,13 what follows are some
selective reflections on the major elements of, and questions raised
by, this momentous decision.

12. Id. at 2582 (majority opinion).
13. Indeed, Professor Brietta Clark has conducted one such analysis in this issue of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review. Brietta Clark, Safeguarding Federalism by Saving Health
Reform: Implications of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 46 LOY. LA. L.
REV. 541 (2013).
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A. Why Did Chief Justice Roberts
Vote and Write As He Did?
With four Justices deeply committed to upholding the individual
mandate under any and all of the powers invoked on behalf of
Congress, and four Justices equally committed to invalidating the
mandate for having no source of power that justified it, speculation
has abounded concerning Chief Justice Roberts’s divided stance,
standing shoulder to shoulder with his more frequent allies in
declaring new limits on the powers of Congress under the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses, but with those more inclined to
favor federal power on the ultimately determinative reliance on the
Taxing Clause. The Chief Justice was also the decisive vote, given
the same split among the other eight Justices, in determining that
what seven Justices thought was an unconstitutionally coercive use
of the conditional spending power could be remedied by removing
the coercive part only and did not require invalidating the conditional
spending Medicaid expansion program as a whole.
Consider a number of possibilities.14 First is simply the
straightforward notion that the Chief Justice was not acting
especially strategically, but instead is genuinely committed to
deferring to the powers of Congress so long as—and only so long
as—Congress acts within historically understood boundaries, not
when it attempts to exercise what he perceives to be new forms of
authority that threaten to convert its limited, enumerated power into
an unlimited general police power. After all, he elsewhere has
supported federal power more unreservedly than most of his state
sovereignty brethren in cases such as United States v. Comstock15
and Arizona v. United States.16 Moreover, as to the holding on the
taxing power, it is well established that the “Federal Government
may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot authorize, forbid or
otherwise control”;17 that if a legislative measure reasonably can be
14. For a lengthy analysis in support of the proposition that “[a]lthough Roberts was clearly
pursuing legal policy goals, the fact that he was willing to vote to uphold the individual mandate
without a clear majority for his conservative legal innovations reaffirms that his dominant interest
was institutional rather than doctrinal,” see Tonja Jacobi, Strategy and Tactics in NFIB v.
Sebelius 7 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Series, No. 12-14), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2133045.
15. 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
16. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012), discussed infra pp. 442–53.
17. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579.
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construed in a way that will preserve its constitutionality, it should
be;18 that even if an exaction is not labeled a tax, it should be
understood to be a tax if it functions like one;19 and that a tax may
have regulatory aims so long as it also raises revenue.20 Given that
the individual mandate was structured in the alternative as a
requirement to purchase health insurance or to pay a “penalty” to the
IRS in a manner that operates a lot like taxes do, that a failure to buy
health insurance triggers no other “negative legal consequences . . .
beyond requiring a payment to the IRS,”21 and that Congress
expected the “shared responsibility payment” to be paid by some
four million people a year,22 reaching the conclusion that the
individual mandate fell within Congress’s power to tax was hardly
revolutionary. Even the joint dissenters did not say Congress could
not have imposed the payment as a tax. They argued instead that
Congress had enacted a requirement with a penalty and not a tax, so
it could not rely on its taxing power.23 A little more deference to
Congress, embracing a functional, rather than a formalistic,
assessment of the individual mandate “penalty,” rather easily and
reasonably renders it a tax on not buying health insurance. Perhaps
more generally, Chief Justice Roberts is willing to extend that
deference in circumstances that do not call for any real expansion of
congressional authority.24
Similarly, acting to preserve the conditional spending provisions
for Medicaid expansion without putting the states that decline to
18. Id. at 2593–94.
19. Id. at 2595–96.
20. Id. at 2596.
21. Id. at 2597.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2651 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
24. Chief Justice Roberts did resolve a new question in favor of Congress—namely, that the
individual mandate, considered as a tax, was not a “direct” tax required to be “apportioned so that
each State pays in proportion to its population” under Article I, Section 9, Clause 4 of the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 2598 (majority opinion). Although the joint dissenters thought that might be
“a difficult constitutional question” that they had “no need to address,” id. at 2655 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting), Chief Justice Roberts rather easily concluded that a
“tax on going without health insurance does not fall within any recognized category of direct
tax,” because it was not a “capitation” and “plainly not a tax on the ownership of land or personal
property.” Id. at 2599 (majority opinion). Finally, the tax was permitted because, unlike the use of
the regulatory power, “the Constitution does not guarantee that individuals may avoid taxation
through inactivity”; although the Taxing power may not be used as a penalty that is the equivalent
of regulation, there was no such danger here, and the Taxing power “does not give Congress the
same degree of control over individual behavior” that the regulatory power does. Id. at 2599–600.
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expand it at risk of losing all their Medicaid funding may be
understood not as a strategic effort to preserve the ACA, but rather as
the appropriately proportionate response to the offending
enforcement mechanism. Remedying only the condition that is
thought to offend the Constitution is hardly a new concept, 25 and for
the Chief Justice to rely on the severability clause set forth in the
chapter that authorized the withholding of all Medicaid funds, and to
conclude that Congress would have wanted to preserve the Medicaid
expansion program even without the stricter enforcement threat,26
was more than reasonable—and completely consistent with adhering
to state sovereignty values that left the States free to choose whether
to accept or decline the expansion and the money that comes with it.
Second, or possibly a more pointed way of saying the same
thing, perhaps the Chief Justice chose to provide Congress no power
it did not already possess, while successfully declaring new limits on
the scope of congressional power in the name of a more robust state
sovereignty. If his purpose was both to preserve a sense of judicial
deference to the lawmaking powers of the Court’s co-equal branches
and to further the state sovereignty agenda, he came as close to a
Solomonic solution as he probably could. For a pragmatist promoting
that particular agenda, it is doubtful that the ultimate target would be
invalidation of the ACA per se rather than the curtailment of
congressional power generally.
Third, as many have speculated, the Chief Justice might well
have borrowed from the constitutional maneuver his predecessor
Chief Justice John Marshall deployed in Marbury v. Madison27 and
declared limits on congressional power—and a robust role for the
judiciary to enforce those limits (federalism limits this time)—
without risking the sort of popular backlash that could call forth
serious reactions that might put the Court’s legitimacy at risk.
Already having provoked powerful negative reactions from its
decisions in Bush v. Gore28 and Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission,29 the Court might have seemed gratuitously provocative
had it invalidated the signature accomplishment of the administration
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974).
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2607–08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
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of President Obama, and the Democratic majority that had been in
place when the ACA was enacted, in the midst of the 2012
presidential campaign where the question of whether to repeal or
continue with the ACA was a hotly contested national issue dividing
the political parties and the populace. Given what the Chief Justice
otherwise could accomplish, why risk making the Court’s behavior
itself more of a campaign issue? There is no reason to doubt that the
Chief Justice’s regard for the Supreme Court as an institution is both
deep and authentic, so even if there was little risk of defiance of a
judgment invalidating the ACA, there was every reason to avoid
inciting unnecessary antagonism toward the Court.
Fourth, it is also possible that the Chief Justice recoiled
somewhat from what seemed to be a relentless and determined quest
of the joint dissenters to destroy the ACA altogether. At each turn,
the opinion of the joint dissenters aggressively resists the ACA: they
found the individual mandate beyond the commerce and necessary
and proper powers of Congress and refused to accept that it could be
understood as an exercise of the taxing power; they found not only
that the Medicaid expansion enforcement provision exceeds the
conditional spending power of Congress, but that the only proper
remedy would be to strike the whole Medicaid expansion policy,
because otherwise “States that decline the Medicaid Expansion must
subsidize, by the federal tax dollars taken from their citizens, vast
grants to the States that accept the Medicaid Expansion”;30 and,
having found both the individual mandate and the Medicaid
expansion provisions unconstitutional, they determined that
Congress would not have wanted the rest of the ACA’s wide-ranging
provisions to stand. The fact that the joint dissent followed this “for
want of a nail, the kingdom was lost” course of reasoning and then
asserted that its approach was the judicially modest one—in contrast
to the approach the Chief Justice ultimately took for a majority,
which the joint dissent described as “vast judicial overreaching”
because it created “a debilitated, inoperable version of health-care
regulation that Congress did not enact and the public does not
expect”31—easily could have prompted the reaction that judicial
modesty did, indeed, lie in something less than wholesale undoing of

30. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2676 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
31. Id.
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what Congress had labored long and hard—and yes,
controversially—to do. To be sure, the individual mandate and the
Medicaid expansion components of the ACA were much more than
just horseshoe nails in relation to a kingdom, but had the joint dissent
been the majority opinion, the Chief Justice might well have
thought—as many in the public undoubtedly would have thought—
that the overweening attack on the constitutional underpinnings of
the ACA went beyond constitutional principle—and certainly
beyond any sense of judicial modesty—to choosing sides in the
partisan debate about the desirability of the ACA. For many, perhaps
including the Chief Justice, the joint dissent’s harsh approach might
have reinforced the sense that judicial modesty would be better
served by striking less of the ACA rather than more.
Finally, consider a fifth variation with a somewhat more
affirmative cast. Suppose that Chief Justice Roberts sought to choose
an approach that left maximum space for encouraging political
participation by the electorate at the same time that he enforced what
he perceived to be essential limits on the power of Congress. His
opinion certainly is written to educate not just the professional
readers of Court opinions, but also the broader public, about the
Court’s limited role. It emphasizes that the Members of the Court
“possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make policy
judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s elected
leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with
them. It is not our job to protect the people from the consequences of
their political choices.”32 And at the close of his opinion, the Chief
Justice reminds readers that “the Court does not express any opinion
on the wisdom of the Affordable Care Act. Under the Constitution,
that judgment is reserved to the people.”33
This might seem like standard fare whenever the Court wishes to
express the important distinction between matters of public policy
and matters of constitutional concern, although the language does
tend to convey a little more forcefully than is sometimes the case that
the people have their own responsibilities for the electoral choices
they make. Another part of his opinion adds a further note of
political responsibility, however, that might be thought to reinforce

32. Id. at 2579 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
33. Id. at 2608 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.).
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the sense that promoting “active liberty,” to use one of Justice
Breyer’s developed notions,34 could have been one of Chief Justice
Roberts’s aims in taking the position he did. Before explaining why
the Medicaid expansion provision was unduly coercive, his opinion
says this:
Congress may attach appropriate conditions to federal
taxing and spending programs to preserve its control over
the use of federal funds. In the typical case we look to the
States to defend their prerogatives by adopting “the simple
expedient of not yielding” to federal blandishments when
they do not want to embrace the federal policies as their
own. The States are separate and independent sovereigns.
Sometimes they have to act like it.35
There is something in his seeming appeal to the public and the
state authorities to undertake responsibility for public policy
decisions with which they may disagree that can be thought to
suggest that reliance on the Court to save them from themselves is
inadequate and probably inappropriate. Basic ground rules may come
from the Court, but political actors must shoulder responsibility
themselves.
No doubt there may be other explanations for why the Chief
Justice followed the approach he did in NFIB. Certainly, the
suggestions I have offered are not contradictory to each other, and
each could form an ingredient contributing to his overall viewpoint.
In any event, his future decisions may bear watching with some or all
of them in mind.
B. The Majority View That Congress Could Not
Impose the Individual Mandate Using Its
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Powers
The opinion of the joint dissenters and that of the Chief Justice,
taken together, constituted a majority view rejecting the
government’s two basic arguments that Congress possessed ample
power under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses to

34. STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2005).
35. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.)
(quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).
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impose on individuals a requirement to purchase health insurance.36
Those Justices argued that the individual mandate could not be
justified either on the basis that the cumulative failure of many
people to purchase health insurance substantially affects interstate
commerce in the economically dominant healthcare and health
insurance markets, or on the ground that the mandate was a
necessary and proper means to further the ACA’s “guaranteed issue”
and “community rating” reforms adopted to improve the functioning
of those markets—reforms that clearly do regulate the economic
activity of health insurers and thus fall within the commerce power.
The fundamental fault these Justices perceived was that while
Congress may regulate pre-existing activity that in the aggregate
substantially affects interstate commerce, it may not compel people
who choose to refrain from entering a market to engage in economic
activity in the first place. Ordering unwilling or uninterested buyers
to purchase a product does not fall within the power “to regulate
Commerce,” they asserted, because that regulatory power applies
only to control of those who engage in activity and not those who,
for their own reasons, are inactive in a particular market. So even if it
is true that the failure of many people to buy health insurance exerts
a powerful economic effect on the cost of health insurance premiums
to many others, and may have other substantial detrimental effects on
interstate commerce, Congress lacks power to direct those people to
become participants in the market.
The driving force behind this conclusion evidently was the
fundamental structural principle that the federal government is one of
limited, enumerated powers, which these Justices believed would be
violated if Congress could compel unwanted economic transactions,
because in their view Congress would then possess unlimited
regulatory authority. Adherence to that view also then defeated the
Necessary and Proper Clause argument, because even if the
individual mandate was necessary or useful to make effective the
ACA’s other insurance reforms designed to end the practice of
denying, or rendering unaffordable, health insurance for people with
pre-existing conditions, it was not a “proper” means for
accomplishing those goals, since it entailed “violat[ing] the

36. See id. at 2584–93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.), 2644–50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, &
Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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background principle of enumerated (and hence limited) federal
power,” as the joint dissenters put it.37 Moreover, only from that
perspective can one make sense of Chief Justice Roberts’s otherwise
remarkable concession that “[t]o an economist, perhaps, there is no
difference between activity and inactivity; both have measurable
economic effects on commerce. But the distinction between doing
something and doing nothing would not have been lost on the
Framers.”38
Nor were these Justices willing to accept the possibility that a
health insurance mandate could be distinguished from other purchase
mandates based on its claimed unique characteristics—namely, that
it would finance health care that virtually everyone will need at some
unpredictable time, and that, unlike any other product or service,
state and federal law require “a certain degree” of health care to be
provided even to those who cannot pay.39 An exception for health
insurance as a unique product could have allowed Congress to
compel purchase here without allowing it to mandate purchases
generally and thus to honor the concern about federal power
becoming unlimited, but the joint dissenters and Chief Justice
Roberts refused to accept that argument either.
This is not the place to delve deeply into the course on which
this majority may have set the Court in future challenges to
congressional exercises of the commerce and necessary and proper
powers. It is enough to make a few key observations. Nonobvious
lines will have to be drawn between activity and inactivity, so that
permissible regulations and prohibitions can be distinguished from
impermissible requirements to enter commerce. More significant,
perhaps, is the wide range of potential implications for congressional
power when future challenges are premised on the claim that a
congressional act violates background principles of limited federal
power. The structural principle invoked has an elasticity to it that
could encompass an awful lot of judicial discretion to restrict
congressional power, and that especially might be so if it is invoked
not only to reduce the scope of the commerce power, but almost by
definition to curtail the scope of the necessary and proper power as
well. Indeed, enforced in an aggressive manner, this understanding of
37. Id. at 2646 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2589 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
39. Id. at 2585–87.
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the necessary and proper power could make it a “truism” that
whatever regulation is not found to fit within an independent power
of Congress cannot be justified under the necessary and proper
power either.40
As Charles Black reminded us long ago,41 structural
constitutional interpretation done well has much to commend it. But
was the structural interpretation of the majority here done well?
Consider several reasons for skepticism. To begin with, the
majority perceived the individual mandate to be an aggressive new
attempt on the part of Congress to expand its power, heightening the
sense that Congress was reaching toward an unlimited regulatory
authority. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that “[l]egislative
novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a first time for everything.”42
But, he argued, “new conceptions of federal power” should be
assessed cautiously.43 Professor Einer Elhauge has disputed the
novelty claim, however, pointing out that “[i]n 1790, the very first
Congress—which incidentally included 20 framers [of the
Constitution]—passed a law that included a mandate: namely, a
requirement that ship owners buy medical insurance for their
seamen,” and that “in 1798, Congress addressed the problem that the
employer mandate to buy medical insurance for seamen covered
drugs and physician services but not hospital stays” by “enact[ing] a
federal law requiring the seamen to buy hospital insurance for
themselves.”44 Perhaps (although not obviously) that individual
insurance mandate might have been thought justified by the
commerce power in a way that could distinguish it from the ACA
mandate, or by another power of Congress, such as the power to
regulate maritime matters. Nevertheless, Professor Elhauge is
40. A far different “truism” was famously declared by the Court in United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941), where Justice Stone wrote that the Tenth Amendment “states but a truism
that all is retained which has not been surrendered.” Id. at 124.
41. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Ox Bow Press 1985) (1969) (arguing that constitutional interpretation
may and often should be predicated upon inferences drawn from the structural features of the
governmental branches and sovereigns recognized in the Constitution and the relationships
among them).
42. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
43. Id.
44. Einer Elhauge, If Health Insurance Mandates Are Unconstitutional, Why Did the
Founding Fathers Back Them?, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com
/article/politics/102620/individual-mandate-history-affordable-care-act, reprinted in OBAMACARE
ON TRIAL 2, 2 (Smashwords ed. 2012).
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persuasive in arguing that these early episodes at least demonstrate
that close to the Founding there was no dispute as to whether an
individual insurance mandate was a “proper” means of exercising
federal power45—and certainly an individual mandate was not
opposed as a severe threat to the structural division of power
between the nation and the states.
More fundamentally, the claim that upholding the individual
mandate would remove any limits on the power of Congress under
the Commerce Clause is highly implausible. Leaving aside for the
moment the more than reasonable possibility of distinguishing the
mandate to buy health insurance from mandates to buy other goods
or services, the Court’s decisions in United States v. Lopez46 and
United States v. Morrison47 impose judicially enforceable limits on
the commerce power that easily would have survived upholding the
mandate. In those cases, the Court majority thought the local
activities regulated—gun possession near schools in the former, and
gender-motivated violence in the latter—were insufficiently
economic in themselves, and too remotely connected from impacts
on interstate commerce, to justify their regulation by Congress. 48 The
individual mandate, by contrast, represents an economic subject of
regulation closely connected to a significant impact on the interstate
insurance and healthcare markets.49 Far from being an arguably
gratuitous, pretextual exercise of the commerce power in the interest
of controlling noneconomic behavior, the individual mandate is
squarely aimed at solving a national economic problem of huge
proportions.
Furthermore, the line between economic activity and economic
inactivity at bottom is a poor proxy for what should distinguish those
regulatory objects that do and do not fall within the commerce
45. Einer Elhauge, A Response to Critics on the Founding Fathers and Health Insurance
Mandates, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 19, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/politics/102739
/individual-mandates-history-maritime-law, reprinted in OBAMACARE ON TRIAL 4, 4
(Smashwords ed. 2012); Einer Elhauge, A Further Response to Critics on the Founding Fathers
and Insurance Mandates, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 21, 2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/article
/politics/102840/health-insurance-individual-mandate-obamacare-constitutionality-framers,
reprinted in OBAMACARE ON TRIAL 7, 7–8 (Smashwords ed. 2012).
46. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
47. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
48. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2623–24 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
49. Id. at 2611.
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power. Consider, for example, that under Wickard v. Filburn,50
Congress was authorized to prohibit the production of wheat to be
consumed locally on the farm, in part to influence the farmer to
purchase wheat in the interstate market when he would prefer to
refrain from that purchase,51 because the “stimulation of commerce is
a use of the regulatory function quite as definitely as prohibitions or
restrictions thereon,”52 whereas under a majority view in NFIB the
individual mandate is held not to be. To be sure, in the former there
is no absolute coercion to buy, but the practical difference is small,
and the economic objective is the same. More fundamentally, if there
is to be judicial enforcement limiting the scope of congressional
power “to regulate Commerce,” rather than reliance on the political
safeguards of federalism to police the definition of acceptable forms
of regulation,53 the proper structural principle, in the words of Chief
Justice Rehnquist in Morrison, “requires a distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local.”54 Any correspondence
between the activity/inactivity distinction and the truly national/truly
local distinction would be coincidental, however, and the individual
insurance mandate in the context of the ACA surely could be
presented as a prime instance of where the economic inactivity of
millions who fail to purchase health insurance is a severe and direct
threat to the national economy.
The joint dissent explicitly disputes the notion that the powers of
Congress should be interpreted with an eye toward facilitating its
capacity to solve national economic problems, however serious. It
firmly asserts that “Article I contains no whatever-it-takes-to-solvea-national-problem power.”55 This may be fine rhetoric, but is it
good constitutional law, especially as applied in the interstate health
insurance context?
The Constitutional Convention initially approved conferring on
Congress power to serve “the general interests of the Union,” before
the Committee of Detail later drafted—without the slightest
50. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
51. Id. at 127.
52. Id. at 128.
53. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2624 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197–98
(1824).
54. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000).
55. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2650.
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indication that it was revising the earlier consensus—the list of
enumerated powers in Article I that was ultimately adopted; and
from that time forward, our nation has continued to debate whether
those enumerated powers should be construed expansively enough to
further the aim of empowering Congress to be able to address “the
general interests of the Union,” or more restrictively to further the
aim of circumscribing national power.56 That is not to abjure the
structural principle that there are limits on the commerce power, but
rather to suggest that there is also an opposing structural principle
that those limits should not be interpreted so stringently as to
hamstring Congress’s ability to attend to “the general interests of the
Union.” Ultimately, the Court is responsible for identifying the
appropriate balance between these two structural imperatives, and it
will be interesting to see whether Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting
prediction proves correct that, “if history is any guide,” the
majority’s categorical stance against purchase mandates “will not
endure.”57
C. The State Sovereignty Limit
on Congress’s Spending Power
The constitutional holding that garnered the support of the most
Justices in NFIB is also the holding most likely to generate more
litigation. The Court had never before held unconstitutional on
federalism grounds a threat by Congress to withhold funding from
states that refused to implement a federal program. Although the
Court previously had made clear that the power of Congress to spend
its revenue “for the . . . general Welfare of the United States”58
includes the power to offer federal funds on conditions that would
influence or induce states to regulate in ways that Congress desired,
it also had indicated that at some point funding pressure could be so
coercive as to become the equivalent of an impermissible,
involuntary mandate for states to do the bidding of Congress. In
56. See JONATHAN D. VARAT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 130–
34 (13th ed. 2009).; see also NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2615 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (citing N. Am. Co. v. Sec. Exch.
Comm’n, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946), for the proposition that “[the commerce power] is an
affirmative power commensurate with the national needs”).
57. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
58. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,59 for example, which rejected a claim
of coercion of state policy choices, the Court first raised the question
of whether “the exertion of a power akin to undue influence . . . can
ever be applied with fitness to the relations between state and
nation,” but then said that “[e]ven on that assumption the location of
the point at which pressure turns into compulsion, and ceases to be
inducement, would be a question of degree,—at times, perhaps, of
fact.”60 The Court was convinced that the congressional spending
program to induce the creation of state unemployment compensation
systems meeting federal criteria did “not go beyond the bounds of
power.”61 As for where the boundary might lie, the Court demurred:
“[w]e do not fix the outermost line. Enough for present purposes that
wherever the line may be, this statute is within it. Definition more
precise must abide the wisdom of the future.”62
Two such subsequent cases, South Dakota v. Dole63 and New
York v. United States,64 also declined to find that federal spending
conditions had crossed the line, and they found no need to fix the line
either. In Dole, the Court found “the argument as to coercion . . . to
be more rhetoric than fact” because Congress had “offered relatively
mild encouragement to the States to enact higher minimum drinking
ages than they would otherwise choose.”65 In New York, the Court
held, among other things, that the “Federal Government may not
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory
program”66 and that a requirement that states either regulate the
disposal of low-level radioactive waste in conformity with federal
policy, or take title to the waste generated within their borders, was
the equivalent of the forbidden compulsion.67 Of particular relevance
here, the Court also concluded that Congress was well within its
spending power to offer financial incentives to states to achieve
federally prescribed deadlines for addressing the radioactive waste
problem.68
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

301 U.S. 458, 590 (1937).
Id. at 590.
Id. at 591.
Id.
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
Id. at 174–77.
Id. at 171–73.
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In the portion of his NFIB opinion joined by Justices Breyer and
Kagan, Chief Justice Roberts first articulated the importance of
“ensuring that Spending Clause legislation does not undermine the
status of the states as independent sovereigns in our federal
system.”69 Previous exercises of conditional federal spending
programs were distinguishable from the Medicaid expansion
provisions of the ACA, he argued, because of the nature and size of
the threat of having all Medicaid funds removed if states did not go
along:
We have upheld Congress’s authority to condition the
receipt of funds on the States’ complying with restrictions
on the use of those funds, because that is the means by
which Congress ensures that the funds are spent according
to its view of the “general Welfare.” Conditions that do not
here govern the use of the funds, however, cannot be
justified on that basis. When, for example, such conditions
take the form of threats to terminate other significant
independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a
means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.70
Unlike the spending condition in Dole, “the ‘financial
inducement’ Congress has chosen is much more than ‘relatively mild
encouragement’—it is a gun to the head.”71 The “threatened loss of
less than half of one percent of South Dakota’s budget left that State
with a ‘prerogative’ to reject Congress’s desired policy, ‘not merely
in theory but in fact.’”72 In contrast, the “threatened loss of over 10
percent of a State’s overall budget . . . is economic dragooning that
leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid
expansion.”73 Like the Court in Steward Machine, the Chief Justice
found “no need to fix a line either. It is enough for today that
wherever that line may be, this statute is surely beyond it.”74
The joint dissenters essentially agreed, but they took into
account a somewhat different range of considerations. They
emphasized that “Congress effectively engages in . . . impermissible
69. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer &
Kagan, JJ.).
70. Id. at 2603–04 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 2604.
72. Id. at 2604–05.
73. Id. at 2605.
74. Id. at 2606.
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compulsion when state participation in a federal spending program is
coerced, so that the States’ choice whether to enact or administer a
federal regulatory program is rendered illusory.”75 They said that
“[w]hether federal spending legislation crosses the line from
enticement to coercion is often difficult to determine, and courts
should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional on this
ground unless the coercive nature of an offer is unmistakably
clear.”76 Here, though, “there can be no doubt.”77 That was in part
because “Medicaid has long been the largest federal program of
grants to the States”78 and the “States are far less reliant on federal
funding for any other program.”79 It was in part because states
“forced out of the Medicaid program would face burdens in addition
to the loss of federal Medicaid funding,” since other funded
programs rely on the assumption of Medicaid.80 And it was also in
part because Congress expressly assumed, as part of its goal of nearuniversal health care coverage, “that no State could possibly refuse
the offer that the ACA extends.”81
Left somewhat unclear are a few matters likely to be the subject
of future litigation. Most obviously, if one half of one percent of a
state’s budget is considered way too little inducement to constitute
compulsion, and more than ten percent is considered way too much,
at what point in between will the balance tip? Is any threat of losing
federal funds that exceed the amount offered to support the federal
program enough to make the threat coercive? Is it a question of how
reliant the state is on the particular federal dollars at risk? How big a
proportion of a state’s budget is at stake? And what weight should be
given to the expectations of Congress as to the likelihood that states
will be able to resist the influence of the federal funding?
In her dissent, joined by Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg
contended that the “coercion inquiry . . . appears to involve political
judgments that defy judicial calculation.”82 She anticipated that

75. Id. at 2660 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2662.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2663.
80. Id. at 2664.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
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“future Spending Clause challenges” are now likely to arrive, and
she asked some of the questions raised in the previous paragraph
about how the Court will go about answering them, as well as a few
others, such as whether it matters if a state has unused state tax
alternatives to make up for federal revenue that might be lost, and
whether state officials might feel coerced into accepting politically
popular federal grants for fear of losing re-election.83
Perhaps there in fact will be more litigation in the future about
the permissibility of federal spending conditions as a result of NFIB,
and perhaps some of those challenges will be quite difficult to
resolve. Yet it seems unlikely that resolving them will be
inordinately or uniquely difficult. Following the joint dissent’s
suggestion that only “unmistakably clear” instances of coercion
should be held impermissible could go a long way toward
ameliorating concerns of judicial overreaching. Moreover, if the
Court is to enforce what it perceives to be core structural federalism
principles as effectively as it does core individual rights principles,
those sorts of difficult decisions are likely necessary and attainable.
It may be worth noting that in the context of the exercise of
constitutionally protected individual liberties, the Court also has
drawn a sharp distinction between refusing to subsidize the exercise
of such liberties, on the one hand, and penalizing them by
withdrawing unrelated government financial support, on the other.
So, for example, in the process of rejecting the claim that Congress
had unconstitutionally “penalized” a woman’s choice to abort her
fetus by repeatedly enacting the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits
the use of federal funds to reimburse the cost of abortions under the
Medicaid program, the Court made the following relevant
observations:
A substantial constitutional question would arise if
Congress had attempted to withhold all Medicaid benefits
from an otherwise eligible candidate simply because that
candidate had exercised her constitutionally protected
freedom to terminate her pregnancy by abortion. This
would be analogous to Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
where this Court held that a State may not, consistent with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments, withhold all
83. Id. at 2640–41.
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unemployment compensation benefits from a claimant who
would otherwise be eligible for such benefits but for the fact
that she is unwilling to work one day per week on her
Sabbath. But the Hyde Amendment, unlike the statute at
issue in Sherbert, does not provide for such a broad
disqualification from receipt of public benefits. Rather, the
Hyde Amendment . . . represents simply a refusal to
subsidize certain protected conduct. A refusal to fund
protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the
imposition of a “penalty” on that activity.84
Likewise, it should not be that surprising to expect that when the
Court is constitutionally committed to protecting the regulatory and
fiscal autonomy of the states from impairment by Congress through
the manipulation of its conditional spending power, the Court would
embrace the same distinction between permissible refusals to fund
and impermissible leveraging of financial influence to penalize states
who refuse to go along with the ACA’s Medicaid expansion by
withholding more than the funds for the expansion program—in this
case, a lot more. For Congress “to withhold all Medicaid benefits
from an otherwise eligible [state] simply because that [state] had
exercised [its] constitutionally protected freedom” to make its own
policy choices pursuant to a fundamental structural principle of state
autonomy also raises a “substantial constitutional question.”85 It is
the “broad disqualification from receipt of public benefits” that can
turn permissible influence into impermissible coercion.86
The emphasis that Chief Justice Roberts placed on spending
conditions that “take the form of threats to terminate other significant
independent grants”87 is fully in accord with the Court’s approach to
penalties on the exercise of protected individual rights, both in
holding unduly coercive the threat to withdraw all Medicaid funding
from states that would not agree to the expansion, and in concluding
that all that was necessary to remedy the constitutional violation was
removal of that threat. Perhaps that is why, in addition to the “active

84. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980).
85. Id.
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603–04 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan,
JJ.); supra p. 425.
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liberty” point made earlier,88 Justices Breyer and Kagan concurred in
that portion of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion.
III. CONGRESS’S CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
POWER EBBS, AS STATE IMMUNITY SWELLS
Unlike the outcome in NFIB, another of the Court’s decisions
this past Term, Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland,89 was a
complete victory for state sovereignty. The Court, with no majority
opinion and four expected dissenters,90 held that Congress exceeded
its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it
sought to authorize suits for damages against state employers who
failed to comply with that part of the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993 (FMLA) that generally requires all employers to grant
unpaid leave to employees with a serious medical condition so that
they might care for themselves.91 Justice Kennedy announced the
Court’s judgment and authored a plurality opinion joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, but Justice Scalia
concurred only in the judgment, taking an even narrower view of
Congress’s power to abrogate state immunity than the plurality did.92
Fifteen years ago, a majority of the Court, in the path-changing
decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,93 introduced a new effort to
confine the power of Congress under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which grants Congress power to “enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions” of the Amendment.94 The
author there, too, was Justice Kennedy, who construed the scope of,
and judicially enforceable limits on, the section 5 power in these
terms:
Congress’ power under § 5 . . . extends only to
“enforc[ing]” the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court has described this power as “remedial” . . . . The
88. See supra p. 425.
89. 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012).
90. Justice Ginsburg wrote the dissent, joined in full by Justice Breyer, and by Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan in all but footnote 1, which reiterated the view, previously rejected by the
Court, that “Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I Commerce
Clause power.” Id. at 1339 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 1338 (plurality opinion).
92. Id. at 1338–39 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
93. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress had exceeded its constitutional authority
when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are
inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the
power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s restrictions on the States . . . Congress does
not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right
is. It has been given the power “to enforce,” not the power
to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation . . . .
While the line between measures that remedy or
prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a
substantive change in the governing law is not easy to
discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in
determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be
observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection,
legislation may become substantive in operation and
effect.95
At least two sorts of restrictions on congressional power were
introduced by this approach. First, and most fundamentally,
Congress could not enforce what it might believe, contrary to the
Court’s view, the Fourteenth Amendment properly should be
understood to forbid.96 Second, despite the promise that Congress
“must have wide latitude in determining” where the line between
remedying or preventing unconstitutional actions and substantively
changing the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment lies, the Court
has administered the “congruence and proportionality” standard in a
fashion that places an increasingly heavy burden on Congress to
demonstrate with substantial evidence that its measures are remedial
or preventative.97
95. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519–20 (citation omitted).
96. For a fully developed contrary perspective proposing that “for purposes of Section 5
power the Constitution should be regarded as having multiple interpreters, both political and
legal” and that specifically would attribute “equal interpretive authority to Congress and to the
Court,” grounded in the view that this “model of polycentric constitutional interpretation . . .
more accurately reflects the understandings and practices that make up our constitutional practice
than does the enforcement model,” see Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1947 (2003).
97. See id. at 1964 (“As the Rehnquist Court has begun to insist that the term ‘enforce’
excludes the power to ‘interpret,’ it has also begun decisively to repudiate the deferential
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The “congruence and proportionality” hurdle that Congress must
overcome applies not only to its direct efforts to define the scope of
the rights to equal protection and due process contained in section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also to the power of Congress—
as a remedial or preventive measure to enforce Fourteenth
Amendment rights—to remove whatever immunity to suit the States
otherwise would have. That was the issue in Coleman, as it had been
in a number of earlier cases,98 particularly in Nevada Department of
Human Resources v. Hibbs,99 which held, 6–3, that Congress
possessed section 5 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity and
authorize suits for damages against state employers who violated the
provisions of the FMLA requiring them to provide unpaid leave to
employees seeking time off for family care, rather than self-care.
Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in Coleman distinguished
Hibbs (from which Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, had dissented) on the basis that in Hibbs there was
“evidence that States had family-leave policies that differentiated on
the basis of sex and that States administered even neutral familyleave policies in ways that discriminated on the basis of sex,”100
whereas in Coleman there was no such evidence of sex
discrimination in the administration of sick leave. Unlike with
family-leave practices, which Congress found to be administered
based on a pervasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family
members is women’s work, the evidence before Congress suggested
that men and women took medical leave approximately equally, and
public employers treated self-care requests from men and women
without gender stereotypes. Although “the self-care provision offers
some women a benefit by allowing them to take leave for pregnancyrelated illnesses[,] . . . as a remedy, the provision is not congruent
and proportional to any identified constitutional violations” since
McCulloch standard.”); see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 958–
59 (3d ed. 2000) (“Thus have laws enacted by Congress pursuant to § 5 suddenly been saddled
with something between intermediate and strict scrutiny, effectuating what can only be
understood as a substantial, albeit not conclusive, presumption of unconstitutionality.”).
98. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expenses Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). For an
early, critical view of the Florida Prepaid and Alden decisions, see TRIBE, supra note 97, at
1374–81.
99. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
100. Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327, 1332 (2012).
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“Congress did not document any pattern of States excluding
pregnancy-related illnesses from sick-leave or disability-leave
policies.”101 Nor did the plurality accept the argument that the selfcare provision was needed to make the family-care provisions
effective based on the notion that the right to self-care would make it
less likely that employers would discriminate against hiring women
in the first place—the theory being that the more the anticipated
leave requests by men and women seemed similar, the less likely
employers would be to factor the fear of disproportionate leave
requests by women into their hiring calculations.102 Finally, the
plurality rejected the claim that the self-care provision was justified
to help single parents, most of whom are women, retain their jobs
when they become ill, for on that view Congress would have been
targeting “neutral leave policies with a disparate impact on women,”
which meant that the self-care provision was “not directed at a
pattern of constitutional violations.”103
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in the judgment reiterated his view
that Congress’s power under section 5 should be limited “to the
regulation of conduct that itself violates the Fourteenth
Amendment.”104 Since failure to grant state employees leave for selfcare did not even “come close” to that, Congress lacked the power to
abrogate state immunity.105 Interestingly, Justice Scalia again called
for abandonment of the “congruence and proportionality” test, this
time based in part on his perception that the differing applications of
it by the plurality and the dissent were both “faithful” to it.106 He
thought the “varying outcomes” the Court arrived at using it made
“no sense” and that the test itself both invited judicial arbitrariness
and required inappropriate “scour[ing of] the legislative record in
search of evidence that supports the congressional action.”107
As for Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which is especially interesting
given her paramount role as a woman’s rights advocate in the
Supreme Court beginning in the 1970s, it noted the FMLA’s
repeated emphasis on the overall goal of reducing gender-based
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 1335.
Id. at 1335–37.
Id. at 1337.
Id. at 1338 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 1338–39.
Id. at 1338.
Id.
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employment discrimination.108 It summarized the history of
disagreements between “equal-treatment” feminists and “equalopportunity” feminists that resulted in the ultimately successful
former group developing—and Congress embracing—“a genderneutral leave model, which eventually became the FMLA,” as a
better mechanism to fight pregnancy discrimination.109 It urged a
reconsideration of the Court’s decision in Geduldig v. Aiello110 that
pregnancy discrimination is not the same as sex discrimination.111
And it contended that even if Geduldig “senselessly holds sway,”112
Congress’s adoption of the self-care leave provision was “a key part
of Congress’ endeavor to make it feasible for women to work and
have families,”113 because it would reduce the incentives employers
might have, based on stereotypical assumptions that women
disproportionately are inclined to ask for family leave, to not hire
women, who were no more likely than men—and perhaps even less
likely, if they did take more family leave—to ask for self-care leave.
By disaggregating the self-care provision of the FMLA from the
family-care provisions upheld in Hibbs, the Court obviously
restricted Congress’s section 5 power further in the interest of
bolstering state sovereign immunity. That the three dissenters in
Hibbs were in the majority in Coleman, together with Chief Justice
Roberts (who replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist, the author of Hibbs)
and Justice Alito (who replaced Justice O’Connor, who had joined
the majority in Hibbs), comes as no surprise. Although it is difficult
to say with certainty, the new majority alignment might also be
expected to limit Congress’s section 5 power even more in the
future—even if they cannot exactly agree on how much, or on what
the proper criteria for evaluation should be.
The severity of the demands imposed on Congress by the
Coleman plurality to justify the exercise of its enforcement powers is
somewhat disturbing. It is at least a little ironic that a Court that
insists in the context of affirmative action policies that race-neutral

108. Id. at 1340 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The FMLA’s purpose and legislative history
reinforce the conclusion that the FMLA, in its entirety, is directed at sex discrimination.”).
109. Id. at 1340–42.
110. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
111. See Coleman, 132 S. Ct. at 1344–45 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1347.
113. Id. at 1349.
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means be preferred to race-conscious ones114 should be so
begrudging about Congress’s use of sex-neutral means to address its
overall concerns about sex discrimination in the workplace through
all the provisions of the FMLA operating together. In any event,
Coleman appears to move further down the path of judicial limitation
of congressional power in order to enhance state sovereign
immunity, and seems to have largely abandoned the promise that,
even under the “congruence and proportionality” test, Congress
would be afforded deference, much less “wide latitude.” Further
steps down that path may be anticipated, whether in this context or in
others.
IV. OF PRECEDENT AND PREEMPTION
The preemption doctrine, which asks whether particular
elements of state law are superseded under the Supremacy Clause115
by federal law or policy, naturally is an important battle site where
federal power and state sovereignty forces clash. Professor Ernest
Young suggests, in fact, “that while cases about the reach of the
Commerce Clause or the scope of state sovereign immunity grab the
headlines, preemption cases make up the functional heart of the
Court’s federalism doctrine.”116 Whether that is a fully accurate
assessment or not, or is in any event subject to change as the Court
introduces more limits on the scope of congressional power, as it did
this past Term, there is no doubt of preemption’s importance for
understanding our constitutional federalism.117
The Court decided three preemption cases in October Term
2011, sustaining almost all the claims in each that federal law
114. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
115. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
116. Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against
Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253, 254 (2012).
117. Professor Young believes that it “is critical to approach preemption questions in ways
that cohere with the broader concerns of constitutional federalism doctrine” and that—at least
prior to the Court’s opinions in NFIB—preemption had “become the central question of our
federalism” in large part because “the enumerated limits of Congress’s powers now play an
extremely limited role in preserving the federal balance.” Id. at 306. Because of his sense that the
Court’s post–New Deal recognition of broad congressional power produced an opposing reaction
of greater sensitivity to interpreting Congress’s preemptive intent more narrowly so that state
authority is not too easily eliminated, one might wonder whether he thinks the converse also
might be true; that is, as the Court in cases like NFIB moves toward circumscribing the powers of
Congress, should the preemptive intent of Congress when exercising power it does possess be
read more broadly, still more narrowly, or not any differently?
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rendered the application of challenged state law impermissible. In
two of the cases, one well-established precedent—though a different
precedent in each—was effectively determinative within its sphere of
influence in support of the preemption result.118 A different minority
group of Justices in each case resisted that determinative influence,
however, and a close look at the Justices’ varying responses to
precedents that all agreed were relevant offers a revealing glimpse of
underlying conceptions of the proper interaction of federal and state
authority in the preemption context, not to mention some insight into
the perceived force of stare decisis.
Certainly the more noticed of the two cases—involving an
immigration regulation controversy that has attracted a huge amount
of public attention—was Arizona v. United States.119 In a preenforcement, facial preemption challenge brought by the United
States, a majority of the Court addressed four provisions of
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, a law expressly designed to “discourage and
deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity
by persons unlawfully present in the United States.”120 By a 5–3
vote,121 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, held that federal
law preempted three provisions of the Arizona law: section 3, which
made failure to comply with federal alien registration requirements a
state misdemeanor; section 5(C), which created another state
misdemeanor for an unauthorized alien to seek or engage in work in
Arizona; and section 6, which authorized state and local police
officers to arrest without a warrant any person an officer “has
probable cause to believe . . . has committed any public offense that
makes [that person] removable from the United States” under federal

118. In the third decision, National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965 (2012), the Court
unanimously held that the express preemption provision of the Federal Meat Inspection Act
(FMIA) prohibited application of a recent California statute that sought to control how an FMIAregulated slaughterhouse deals with nonambulatory pigs. The FMIA’s express preemption clause
“prevents a State from imposing any additional or different—even if nonconflicting—
requirements that fall within the scope of the Act and concern a slaughterhouse’s facilities or
operations.” Id. at 970. Thus, the California regulatory scheme was preempted, because it called
for different treatment than that allowed by the FMIA. Id. at 975. The decision turned on the
proper interpretation of the scope of the FMIA express preemption provision and did not require
engagement with any particular judicial precedent.
119. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
120. Id. at 2497 (quoting the note following ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051 (2012)).
121. Id. Justice Kagan did not participate, presumably because of her involvement with the
suit filed by the United States against Arizona when she was solicitor general.
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law.122 The majority rejected, however, the facial preemption
challenge to section 2(B)—the colloquially named “show me your
papers” provision of S.B. 1070—which requires police officers in
most circumstances to make a “reasonable attempt . . . to determine
the immigration status” of anyone they stop, detain, or arrest “in the
enforcement of any other [state or local] law or ordinance . . . where
reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien and is
unlawfully present in the United States.”123 Largely for three reasons
the Court declined to assume that the state courts would construe
section 2(B) “in a way that creates a conflict with federal law.” 124
First, Congress had encouraged through statute the sharing of
information about possible immigration violations between federal
and state authorities.125 Second, under state law a valid Arizona
driver’s license would satisfy the inquiry, and racial profiling and
inconsistency with federal immigration regulations and federal civil
rights guarantees were prohibited in the implementation of section
2(B).126 Finally, the state courts had not had an opportunity to
interpret the provision to allay concerns either about possible
detentions for the sole purpose of verifying immigration status or
about possible unduly prolonged detentions not justified by other
state or local law,127 The majority was keen to say, however, that
“[t]his opinion does not foreclose other preemption and
constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it
goes into effect.”128
Unsurprisingly, in order to decide these preemption challenges,
the Court (and the parties) invoked Hines v. Davidowitz,129 the
classic 1941 decision that was the most obvious precedent to be
addressed. Hines, which invalidated a Pennsylvania alien registration
law whose substantive requirements differed from those of the
federal alien registration scheme in place at the time, was
characterized (not for the first time) as “a field preemption case.”130

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 2497–98.
Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2510.
Id. at 2508 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2507–08.
Id. at 2509.
Id.
312 U.S. 52 (1941).
Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2502.

Winter 2013]

FOREWORD

445

Under “field” preemption, state regulation of anything in the defined
field is prohibited because Congress has determined that the field
must be regulated by its exclusive governance.131 According to the
majority, because the current federal statutory framework for alien
registration remains “comprehensive,” and “[w]here Congress
occupies an entire field, as it has in the field of alien registration,
even complementary state regulation is impermissible,”132 Arizona
could not punish failure to comply with federal registration
requirements. To allow Arizona—and every other state—to do so
would diminish federal control over enforcement.
Justice Kennedy rejected Arizona’s contention “that § 3 can
survive preemption because [it] has the same aim as federal law and
adopts its substantive standards.”133 That argument “ignores the basic
premise of field preemption—that States may not enter, in any
respect, an area the Federal Government has reserved for itself.”134
Allowing section 3 to operate would recognize state power “to bring
criminal charges . . . for violating a federal law even in
circumstances where federal officials in charge of the comprehensive
scheme determine that prosecution would frustrate federal
policies.”135 Besides, unlike the federal regulatory regime, section 3
precluded probation and the possibility of a pardon.136
The three separate concurring and dissenting opinions are
particularly noteworthy for their treatment of Hines as applied to
section 3. Justice Scalia would have upheld section 3 despite Hines.
He denied that Hines established “a ‘field preemption’ that implicitly
eliminates the States’ sovereign power to exclude those whom
federal law excludes.”137 Rather, in his view, Hines only “held that
the States are not permitted to establish ‘additional or auxiliary’
registration requirements for aliens.”138 Arizona did not do that; it
131. Id. at 2501 (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 115 (1992)).
132. Id. at 2502.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2503.
136. Id. Hines is also the source of the category of “obstacle preemption,” said to be a
particular species of “conflict preemption,” where state law is preempted if it “stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”
Hines, 312 U.S. at 67. The challenges to sections 5(C), 6, and 2(B) were addressed under that
rubric. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2503–10.
137. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2518 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
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“merely ma[de] a violation of state law the very same failure to
register and failure to carry evidence of registration that are
violations of federal law.”139 Borrowing from Justice Stone’s
dissenting opinion in Hines, Justice Scalia interpreted Hines to allow
a state to rely on the federal registration system to aid in the
enforcement of state laws that constitutionally could be applied to
aliens, such as Arizona’s law denying unemployment benefits to
illegal aliens.140 He dismissed the majority’s concern that more
vigorous state enforcement of federal registration requirements might
frustrate federal enforcement choices, because such state power
would be “entirely appropriate when the State uses federal law (as it
must) as the criterion for the exercise of its own power, and the
implementation of its own policies of excluding those who do not
belong there.”141
Justice Thomas, in his separate concurring and dissenting
opinion, also thought that “Hines at most holds that federal law preempts the States from creating additional registration requirements,”
and “here, Arizona is merely seeking to enforce the very registration
requirements that Congress created.”142 Thus, section 3 was valid,
because “nothing in the text of the relevant federal statutes indicates
that Congress intended enforcement of its registration requirements
to be exclusively the province of the Federal Government.”143 Like
Justice Scalia, in other words, Justice Thomas defined more narrowly
than the majority the “field” that Hines said Congress had occupied.
Unlike Justices Scalia and Thomas, who would have upheld all
the challenged provisions of S.B. 1070, Justice Alito, in his separate
concurring and dissenting opinion, agreed with the Court that section
3 was preempted “by virtue of our decision in Hines,” because “[o]ur
conclusion in that case that Congress had enacted an ‘all-embracing
system’ of alien registration and that States cannot ‘enforce
additional or auxiliary regulations’ . . . forecloses Arizona’s attempt
here to impose additional, state-law penalties for violations of the
federal registration scheme.”144 Justice Alito elaborated that

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2519.
Id. at 2523 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id.
Id. at 2524–25 (citation omitted).
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“[a]lthough there is some ambiguity in Hines, the Court largely
spoke in the language of field pre-emption.”145 And he was clear that
“[i]f we credit our holding in Hines that Congress has enacted ‘a
single integrated and all-embracing system’ of alien registration and
that States cannot ‘complement’ that system or ‘enforce additional or
auxiliary regulations,’ then Arizona’s attempt to impose additional,
state-law penalties for violations of federal registration requirements
must be invalidated.”146
Did Justices Scalia and Thomas fail to “credit” the holding in
Hines? If so, what might have accounted for their deviation from the
force of precedent? And, was the deviation—or at least such a
crabbed reading of that precedent—justified absent any suggestion
that Hines should be reconsidered?
Before undertaking that examination, however, it may be useful
to contrast the Justices’ respective approaches to Arizona v. United
States with their approaches to another preemption case from last
term that lacked such high visibility. Strikingly, Justice Thomas
authored the majority opinion for six Justices that included Justice
Scalia in Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.,147 holding that
state-law tort claims for both defective design and failure to warn
were preempted by the federal Locomotive Inspection Act (LIA),
because under a 1926 precedent, Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line
Railraod Co.,148 Congress had preempted the entire field of
regulating locomotive equipment.149 The tort suit alleged that a
welder and machinist had contracted malignant mesothelioma while
working with locomotive brakeshoes and engine valves that
contained asbestos, and that the manufacturers’ defective design of
those products and failure to warn of their danger and how to use
them safely rendered them liable for his injuries. Justice Thomas
noted that the claimants “do not ask us to overrule Napier and thus
do not seek to overcome the presumption of stare decisis that
attaches to this 85-year-old precedent.”150 And he rejected all their
attempts to suggest that their claims “fall outside of the field pre-

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 2529.
Id. at 2530 (citation omitted).
132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012).
272 U.S. 605 (1926).
Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1264.
Id. at 1267.
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empted by the LIA, as it was defined in Napier.”151 In particular, the
Court refused to narrow the preempted field to exclude “hazards
arising from repair and maintenance (as opposed to those arising
from use on the line)”152 or to exclude at least the failure-to-warn
claims, which, in the majority’s view were “directed at the
equipment of locomotives” and, thus, “fall within the pre-empted
field defined by Napier.”153
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
concurred in part, agreeing that the LIA preempted the defectivedesign claims, but she dissented from the decision to preempt the
failure-to-warn claims.154 She suggested that the Court “might decide
Napier differently today,” because it “implied field preemption from
the LIA’s mere delegation of regulatory authority to the Interstate
Commerce Commission” and the LIA lacked either textual language
expressly requiring field preemption or any substantive regulations,
“let alone a ‘scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it.’”155 Even accepting the force of this long established
precedent and the value of “statutory stare decisis,” as did the
majority, and concluding therefore that the “defective-design claims
fall within the pre-empted field because they would impose state-law
requirements on a locomotive’s physical makeup,” Justice
Sotomayor nonetheless argued that the “failure-to-warn claims . . .
proceed on a fundamentally different theory of tort liability that does
not implicate a product’s physical composition at all.”156
Accordingly, she thought the majority extended the field preemptive
effect of the LIA “well beyond what Napier requires.”157
Justice Kagan, who later did not participate in Arizona v. United
States, expressed doubts similar to those expressed by Justice
Sotomayor about whether Napier would be decided the same way
today, because its field preemption conclusion was “based on
nothing more than a statute granting regulatory authority over [the]

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 1267–68.
Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1271 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 1271–72.
Id. at 1272.
Id. at 1275.
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subject matter [of locomotive equipment] to a federal agency.”158 But
she concluded that Napier meant that “the scope of the agency’s
power” under the LIA determined “the boundaries of the preempted
field,” and that meant, in turn, that because the agency had authority
both to regulate the design of locomotive equipment and to require
warnings about their safe use, both the defective-design and failureto-warn claims fell into the preempted field.159
In the end, differing Court majorities gave both Hines and
Napier their fullest due in Arizona v. United States and Kurns,
respectively, applying their precedential scope broadly when
defining the “field” that Congress had preempted. Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Alito (at least with respect to
section 3 of S.B. 1070) followed that approach in both cases, and one
might surmise that Justice Kagan likely would have as well, had she
participated in both. But what about Justices Scalia and Thomas, who
were anxious to limit the scope of field preemption in Arizona but
not in Kurns? Or Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, who
took the exact opposite position? Here lies a potentially illuminating
entry into these cases.
In several respects, the Scalia and Thomas approaches to the two
cases are more difficult to fathom. After all, in both Hines and
Arizona, the context is regulation of a group of people—aliens—
whose treatment inevitably might implicate sensitive foreign policy
concerns of the United States, where singular treatment by the
federal government is more likely to be desired. That might lead one
to expect that any thumb on the scale of the federal/state balance
likely would be placed on the federal preemption side, as the
majorities in both cases did in reaching the conclusion both that
Congress had occupied the field of alien registration regulation and
that the scope of the field should be defined broadly enough to be
responsive to those imperatives.160 By contrast, the federal interest in
158. Id. at 1270 (Kagan, J., concurring).
159. Id. Justice Sotomayor responded that if the power to require warnings existed, that power
was limited to “warnings that impose direct requirements on the physical composition of
locomotive equipment” and did not extend to the failure-to-warn claims asserted in this case. Id.
at 1275 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
160. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Arizona emphasized not only the power of
Congress over naturalization and its inherent sovereign power to conduct foreign relations, but
also the importance of discretion in the executive branch when enforcing immigration law,
especially since “[s]ome discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s
international relations.” Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
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Napier and Kurns implicates only ordinary domestic concerns,
important perhaps, but not so much so that, where an interpretive
choice is to be made, the implicated federal interest necessarily
should be thought to overcome the usual presumption against the
preemption of state law.161
Furthermore, there was little disagreement in Arizona that
“[f]ederal governance of immigration and alien status is extensive
and complex.”162 Indeed, whatever the full scope of the field of
federal alien registration regulation might be, there was no doubt that
Congress had enacted many statutes of relevance in the area. Even
the survival of section 2(B) was the product of yet further
congressional legislation governing cooperation in information
sharing between federal and state authorities about the legal status of
individual aliens.163 By comparison, Kurns, like Napier, drew on the
LIA’s delegation of authority to the regulatory agency, rather than its
extensive exercise, when defining its broad scope of field
preemption.
Nor can the difference be explained by the fact that no party in
Kurns had asked for reconsideration of Napier, as Justice Thomas
noted. Neither Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, nor anyone else
suggested in Arizona that Hines be reconsidered rather than narrowly
construed.
If the federal side of the equation leaned more in the direction of
preemption in Arizona than Kurns, then what about the state side of
161. The classic formulation of these notions comes from Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.,
331 U.S. 218 (1947), where the Court explained its approach when Congress has legislated “in a
field which the States have traditionally occupied”:
[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to
be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress. . . . Such a purpose may be evidenced in several ways. The scheme of
federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it. . . . Or the Act of Congress may
touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be
assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. Likewise, the
object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations
imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. . . . Or the state policy may produce a
result inconsistent with the objective of the federal statute. . . . It is often a perplexing
question whether Congress has precluded state action or by the choice of selective
regulatory measures has left the police power of the States undisturbed except as the
state and federal regulations collide.
Id. at 230–31 (emphasis added).
162. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.
163. Id. at 2508.
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the equation? Here is where Justice Scalia in particular took a robust
stand. His opinion argues aggressively that Arizona, like all the states
in the Union, possesses “the defining characteristic of sovereignty:
the power to exclude from the sovereign’s territory people who have
no right to be there.”164 Although he acknowledged that since the
founding era “primary responsibility for immigration policy has
shifted from the States to the Federal Government,” he argued that
“[i]mplicit ‘field preemption’ will not do” to remove “the core of
state sovereignty: the power to exclude.”165 He denigrated the
majority’s willingness to draw support for its field preemption
conclusion from the Federal Government’s sensitivity to the
concerns of “foreign countries . . . about the status, safety, and
security of their nationals in the United States,”166 declaring that
“[e]ven in its international relations, the Federal Government must
live with the inconvenient fact that it is a Union of independent
States, who have their own sovereign powers.”167 For Justice Scalia,
only where Arizona law might conflict with federal immigration law
would there be preemption. He found no conflict in any of the
challenged parts of S.B. 1070 and no field preemption “of additional
state penalties” for federal immigration violations.168
Justice Thomas reached the same conclusion, but in a much
simpler way. He refused to hold that Congress preempted the field of
enforcing federal registration standards by following his proposed
general approach that preemption should follow only from conflicts
“between the ‘ordinary meanin[g]’ of the relevant federal laws” and
the challenged state law provisions.169 Since “nothing in the text of
the relevant federal statutes indicates that Congress intended
enforcement of its registration requirements to be exclusively the
province of the Federal Government,” section 3 was not
preempted.170
A charitable reading of his opinion for the Court in Kurns
(which Justice Scalia joined), one that would make it consistent with
164. Id. at 2511 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
165. Id. at 2513–14.
166. Id. at 2498 (majority opinion).
167. Id. at 2514–15 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
168. Id. at 2519.
169. Id. at 2522 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 588 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
170. Id. at 2523 (emphasis added).
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his opinion in Arizona, would suggest that it was only the textual
interpretation of the LIA in Napier that led to his view that the
failure-to-warn, as well as the defective-design, claims were
preempted in the former. The difference between his majority
opinion and that of the concurring and dissenting Justices, then,
would reduce to what the “ordinary meaning” of the LIA is.
Although he invoked the special force of “statutory stare decisis” in
Kurns, it is unclear why that force should not have applied equally in
Arizona. Realistically, moreover, what the “ordinary meaning” is
itself is a matter of some discretionary interpretive choice. No doubt
the textualist approach is grounded in part on a belief that a linguistic
interpretive choice is less likely to allow for judicial policy discretion
than is an interpretive choice based on “judicially divined legislative
purposes”171 that take account of background policies and contexts.
And interestingly, there was no reference in Kurns to the
presumption against preemption. Had there been, one might have
thought that preserving a traditional state tort law cause of action
might have bolstered the desire to preserve as much of state law as
possible, as the concurring and dissenting Justices would have done
by holding that federal law did not preempt the failure-to-warn
claims. Certainly one might imagine the possibility that Justice
Scalia, at least, who was so anxious in Arizona to preserve state
power to exclude aliens unlawfully present under federal law, might
have approached the preservation of state common law causes of
action in similar fashion. Whether or not Justice Sotomayor’s
opinion in Kurns is a better reading of the scope of the LIA’s
preemptive effect as interpreted by Napier than the majority’s, it is at
least a plausible reading, and the presumption against preemption, if
applied, might have made all the difference in the case. As it was,
reading Napier for all it was worth tended to serve the interest in
reducing the potential liability of certain businesses, perhaps a not
unwelcome consequence to a number of Justices in the majority in
Kurns.
In the end, the comparison of the multiple opinions in Arizona
and Kurns highlights several points. First, the doctrines of “field
preemption” and “obstacle” preemption are alive and well, in
significant part due to well-established precedent. Second,
171. Id. at 2524.
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preemption doctrine generally continues to consist of several strands.
Dominant federal interests, pervasiveness of federal regulation,
inquiries into federal purposes, the nature and strength of the
particular state interests that would be sacrificed if preemption is
found, and concerns about excessive judicial policymaking all
remain grist for the preemption mill. Third, with the exception of
Justice Alito, who complained in his concurring and dissenting
opinion in Arizona that the Court there gave “short shrift to our
presumption against pre-emption,”172 that presumption was largely
absent in the analyses. In Arizona, that might signify what seems to
be a pretty consistent Court view that when “the field is one that is
traditionally deemed ‘national,’ the Court is more vigilant in striking
down what would amount to state incursions into subjects that
Congress may have validly reserved to itself.”173 Foreign policy and
immigration policy are among those national subjects, as the Court
emphasized.174 And perhaps Kurns offers supporting evidence for
Professor Young’s view that whether or not the Court finds
preemption, “when the Justices think that the preemption question is
not a close one, they often choose not to invoke Rice’s tiebreaker
rule.”175 Fourth, perhaps stare decisis exerts more influence in
preemption cases than in other contexts. Fifth, the “generally
deregulatory” effect of federal preemption176 may have rendered
preemption more attractive to Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Alito
when it was businesspeople rather than unauthorized aliens who
would be deregulated by preemption. Finally, for those dissenters in
Arizona, the pull of state sovereignty was vastly stronger than in
Kurns.
V. CONCLUSION
When the results of the battles between state sovereignty and
federal power in the October Term 2011 of the Supreme Court are
tallied, and the smoke has cleared, the federal taxing power, the
172. Id. at 2530 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
173. TRIBE, supra note 97, at 1210.
174. Similarly, on a previous occasion Justice Kennedy had emphasized for a unanimous
Court in United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000), with respect to the subject of “national
and international maritime commerce[,]” that “there is no beginning assumption that concurrent
regulation by the State is a valid exercise of its police powers.”) Id. at 108.
175. Young, supra note 116, at 308.
176. Id. at 342.
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preemptive force of the federal immigration power, and at least to a
significant extent, the federal conditional spending power have
withstood state sovereignty assaults. On the other hand, the federal
commerce power, the necessary and proper power, the federal
spending power (to a certain but probably limited extent), and the
Section 5 enforcement power suffered meaningful losses. The tilt is
clear, and the strength of the state sovereignty forces remains
undiminished, as it has since Justice Thomas replaced Justice
Marshall.
It is true and of interest that noticeable and important differences
in how far the federal power containment campaign should go
emerged within the governing state sovereignty majority, most
dramatically with the decision of Chief Justice Roberts in NFIB to
pull back and uphold nearly all of the ACA, and to a significant
extent with the immigration preemption rulings supported by the
Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy in the Arizona decision. Justice
Scalia’s unyielding state sovereignty positions in NFIB, Coleman,
and Arizona seem to represent the most aggressive—and in the latter
two cases, the most singular—attacks on federal power, although
Justice Thomas remains willing to go further in one respect and
reconsider the long-established power of Congress to regulate
commerce among the States based on the substantial cumulative
effect of local activity, while he continues for the time being to
adhere to the “congruence and proportionality” approach to
Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Chief Justice Roberts appears at the moment to be the most
deferential toward federal power of the governing state sovereignty
majority, whether for reasons of institutional strategy, stare decisis,
or (more likely in my view) his genuine belief that federal authority
has more compelling claims to recognition in some respects than his
state sovereignty brethren hold. Justices Kennedy and Alito continue
to push more strongly than the Chief Justice would toward limiting
federal power, though not as much as Justices Scalia and Thomas.
Still, overall the federal power containment project continues.
What does this portend for the future? Further curtailment of
congressional power seems likely. In its 2009 decision in Northwest
Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder,177 the Court
177. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
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offered strong hints that it might determine Congress’s 2006
reauthorization of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA)
to be an unconstitutional exercise of the congressional power to
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s ban on racial discrimination in
voting, largely on the basis that Congress, in light of intervening
changes since 1965, no longer had a sufficient evidentiary record of
continued disenfranchisement of racial minorities by covered
jurisdictions before it in 2006 to justify the stringent remedial
measures prescribed by the VRA’s section 5. Such a decision would
fit well with the implications of City of Boerne and its most recent
incarnation in Coleman.178
The line between permitted inducement and forbidden coercion
resulting from federal spending conditions is likely to be tested
further, but it is not yet evident that the outcome will amount to a
significant incursion into Congress’s ability quite effectively to
influence state behavior through funding policies. More likely to lead
to significant further restrictions on congressional power are the
combined majority’s articulations in NFIB of why neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and Proper Clause—either
independently or taken together—could support the ACA’s
individual mandate. That is not because it seems at all probable that
Congress will enact further individual mandates. Indeed, the paucity
of such mandates in the past might be understood to reflect a sense in
Congress, not so much that they always were constitutionally
dubious (as the Chief Justice would have it), but that their likely
unpopularity means that the political check on Congress is more than
adequate to prevent their adoption except for the most compelling of
reasons. Nonetheless, if—especially after the NFIB decision—that
particular form of regulation is not likely to recur, the broader
structural state sovereignty underpinnings of the majority’s approach
to the commerce and necessary and proper powers of Congress seem
likely to be invoked in other limiting forms. In what contexts, in
what forms, and to what degree remain uncertain, but the ongoing

178. The Court recently granted certiorari in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder, No. 12–96,
2012 WL 3018430, at *1 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012), “limited to the following question: Whether
Congress’ decision in 2006 to reauthorize Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act under the preexisting coverage formula of Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act exceeded its authority under
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and thus violated the Tenth Amendment and Article
IV of the United States Constitution.”
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drive to contain the power of Congress in the name of replenishing
the forces of state sovereignty seems embedded for now.

